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Introduction
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM
Agreement) ﬁrmly strengthened the disciplines on subsidies affecting trade in
goods. Yet, the birth of this multilateral agreement in 1995 elicited a vivid dis-
cussion on whether it overly conﬁnes developing countries’ policy space to employ
subsidies as a development tool. The 2006 UNCTAD Trade and Development
Report for instance concluded that it ‘impinges directly on national rulemaking
authority’.1 WTO Director-General Lamy ﬁrmly responded to what he called an
accusation:
The alternative, it seems, would be to have no subsidy disciplines, which raises an
intriguing question. Do we want to argue that the best contribution the WTO can
make to development is to ensure that developing countries have no obligations in
this area? Or that export subsidies should be allowed?2
Aiming to address this intriguing question, this contribution starts with an
overview of the predecessors of the SCM Agreement and continues with an in-
depth legal analysis of the exact ‘Special and Differential’ (S&D) treatment de-
lineated for developing countries.3 In a ﬁnal section, insights of economic research
are integrated in order to normatively assess the existing regulatory framework: Is
this the best contribution that the WTO can make to development?
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1 UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 2006 –Global Partnership and National Policies for
Development (New York: United Nations Publications, 2006), 237 pp., at 169.
2WTO, Lamy Calls for Debate on ‘Flexibility’ and What Makes Good ‘Policy Space’ (27 September
2006).
3 S&D treatment under the Agreement on Agriculture is not addressed.
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1. Historical context
In search for multilateral disciplines preventing devastating beggar-thy-neighbor
reﬂexes, the US introduced in the mid 1940s the text which served as the basis for
the negotiations on an International Trade Organization (ITO). In its Suggested
Charter, drafted in close consultation with the UK, it proposed to phase-out export
subsidies4 and to introduce procedural disciplines on all trade distorting subsidies,
but did not stipulate any S&D treatment.5 In discussing its proposed disciplines on
tariff bindings with developing countries, the US delegate had nonetheless
emphasized the relevance of subsidies as policy instruments, but considered that
sufﬁcient policy space would remain in place:
These countries, deeply concerned with the problem of industrialization and full
employment, want to use restrictive measures to protect their infant industries. In
general, they remain unimpressed with our contention that subsidies offer the
least objectionable method for this purpose. They point out that, while tariffs and
subsidies both amount to charges on their economies, the very real difﬁculties in
raising the revenue to pay subsidies make the latter impractical for them.6
This quote illustrates that, since the very beginning of the multilateral trade
regime, participants very well understood some fundamentals of basic trade
economics. First of all, if production is too low because of a domestic market
failure, a production subsidy is superior to a tariff as corrective instrument since the
latter also negatively affects consumers in the domestic market. This theoretical
argument also found empirical support in the second half of the twentieth century
in the superior performance of outward-oriented, ‘export-promotion’ strategies
(adopted in particular by East Asian countries) over inward-oriented, ‘import-
substitution’ strategies (often adopted by Latin American countries).7 Moreover,
the argument that developing countries would de facto not be able to use their
policy space for subsidization suggests that they would have an interest that more
4An exception related to agricultural export subsidies was inscribed.
5 The US rejected the infant industry argument on classic grounds (i.e., inefﬁcient local production) and
S&D treatment did not serve its export interests. See R. E. Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT
Legal System (Aldershot: Gower, 1987), 259 pp., at 9–10.
6 As cited in D. Irwin, P. C. Mavroidis, and A. O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), at 76, 104–105. See also London Draft (E/PC/T/33), at 8, 16, 17, 32.
7 The contribution of selective (export) subsidies in such export-promotion strategy remains debated. In
theory, an export subsidy is equally not an optimal instrument to correct domesticmarket failures as it, like
tariffs, negatively affects domestic consumption but a recent World Bank study stressed that selective
interventions spurring export diversiﬁcation could be useful for low-income countries (see also below). See
J. N. Bhagwati, ‘Export-Promoting Trade Strategy, Issues and Evidence’, 3:1 World Bank Research
Observer (January, 1988), 27–57; World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 389 pp.; Commission on Growth and Development, The
Growth Report – Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development (Washington, DC: The
World Bank, 2008), 190 pp.; R. Newfarmer, W. Shaw, and P. Walkenhorst (eds.), Breaking into New
Markets –Emerging Lessons for Export Diversiﬁcation (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2009),
265 pp.
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developed countries are constrained in their leeway to offer subsidies as they can
never win a ‘subsidy war’ in export competing sectors.
At the end of the ITO negotiations, the Havana Charter disciplined subsidies
largely along the same lines as initially suggested by the US and UK but this Charter
was never implemented, implying that only the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) came into force. Because the principle prohibition of export
subsidies was not transposed to the GATT, this agreement did not contain any
substantive discipline on subsidies.8 Observe that the absence of more ﬂexibility for
developing countries on subsidies under the Havana Charter reﬂected the general
victory of the US in limiting S&D treatment. But this initial and unimplemented US
victory dissolved when the ﬁrst effective substantive disciplines were drafted over
the next decades.9
Since the GATT did not prevent destructive subsidy competition for penetrating
export markets,10 negotiations on substantive disciplines on export subsidies were
launched already in the 1950s, ﬁnally resulting in a non-exhaustive list of
prohibited export subsidies on non-primary products (the 1960 Declaration juncto
Article XVI:B of the GATT). Developing countries (except for Zimbabwe) were
however unwilling to adopt the 1960 Declaration, because of the more ﬂexible
treatment of primary products and their wish to preserve policy space.11,12
A further step in disciplining subsidies was made in the Tokyo Round Subsidies
Code (1979), which was a plurilateral agreement (only accepted by 24 countries)
that entered into force in 1980. It resulted from a compromise between the US,
aiming at more stringent subsidy disciplines to block the revival of ‘competitive
subsidization’,13 and other GATT Contracting Parties, aiming at more stringent
disciplines on unilateral countervailing duties (CVDs) on ‘subsidized’ imports.
Next to strengthening disciplines on CVDs, this code prohibited export subsidies
on non-primary goods (including a non-exhaustive list that built on the
1960 Declaration) and introduced rather ﬂexible substantive disciplines on
domestic subsidies. Raising the infant-industry argument and threatening to refrain
from signing the code,14 developing countries successfully negotiated to be
‘virtually’ excused from all new subsidy disciplines, which was clearly ‘a defeat’
8 See Hudec, above n. 5, at 23.
9 The US stance was weakened by its own persistent demand for more ﬂexibility in the ﬁeld of
agriculture. See Hudec, above n. 5, at 15−16.
10 The multilateral non-violation complaint (XXIII(b) of the GATT) and unilateral CVDs are
ineffective to protect exporters’ interests in third markets.
11 J. H. Jackson,World Trade and the Law of GATT –A Legal Analysis of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969), at 399.
12 For a list of 17 signatories, see MTN.GNG/NG10/W/4, 28 April 1987, at 75.
13 GATT Director-General as cited in T. P. Stewart (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round –A Negotiating
History (1986–1992) –Volume 1 (Deventer: Kluwer, 1993), 1,382 pp., at 815.
14 Export subsidies were also seen as means of offsetting other distortions (e.g., overvalued exchange
rate, high tariffs on imported capital goods).
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for the US.15 Attempting to strengthen their export subsidy obligations, the US
however refrained from offering Subsidies Code treatment to developing countries
that did not enter into a commitment to reduce export subsidies.16 Developing
countries (as well as the EC) ﬁrmly and correctly objected the legality of this
position,17,18 which complicated and in some instances even prevented their
accession to the Subsidies Code.19 This discussion shows the growing unease on the
part of the US on what it called ‘unfair’ competition from producers of developing
countries as they steadily gained market share in previously US dominated sectors.
L’histoire se répète in the 1980s: competitive subsidization in response to an
economic downturn,20 a multilateral framework still unable to halt this subsidy
and CVD reﬂex, and negotiations in a new trade round, the Uruguay Round
(1986–1994), with a similar agenda among participants; the US continued its ‘anti-
subsidy’ crusade whereas the others, including developing countries, advocated
more stringent rules on CVDs. But the outcome with regard to developing countries
was substantially dissimilar. Indeed, the strengthening of subsidy disciplines on
developing countries was one of the novelties of the multilateral SCM Agreement,
binding on all WTO Members. Article 27 of this agreement elaborates S&D
treatment and, as if it were a preamble, still declares that ‘Members recognize that
subsidies may play an important role in economic development programmes of
developing countries’, but it will be analysed in the next sections whether the agree-
ment indeed leaves sufﬁcient policy space to this end.21 In the Doha Round
launched in 2001, developing countries have introduced a number of proposals to
reintroduce more ﬂexibility, though these have been highly contested.22 Given the
deadlock in the negotiations, several unresolved aspects on S&D treatment might
have to be solved by the case law.
2. Legal analysis
2.1 Introduction: scope and disciplines of the SCM Agreement
Only measures that qualify as speciﬁc subsidies within the meaning of Articles 1
and 2 of the SCM Agreement are disciplined under this agreement and could be
15 They failed to obtain S&D treatment regarding CVD action by other countries.
16 See SCM/M/3, 27 June 1980, at 3–9; SCM/W/116, 5 September 1986; MTN.GNG/NG10/W/4,
28 April 1987, at 87–93; Hudec, above n. 5, at 88–89.
17 See SCM/M/3, 27 June 1980, at 5–10.
18 See Hudec, above n. 5, at 83–84, 89, referring to L/4905, 3 December 1979; L/3149, 29 November
1968.
19 See, for example, SCM/M/19, 21 February 1984, at 9–11; SCM/M/3, 27 June 1980.
20 See Leutwiler Report: A. Dunkel, Trade Policies for a Better Future –The ‘Leutwiler Report’, the
GATT and the Uruguay Round (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 174 pp., at 46.
21 Article 27.1; see also Panel Report, Brazil–Aircraft (Article 21.5 –Canada) (WT/DS46/RW, adopted
4 August 2000), footnote 49.
22 The latest draft text: TN/RL/W/236, 19 December 2008. An overview of the latest state of
negotiations: TN/RL/W/254, 21 April 2011.
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vulnerable to CVD action by other WTOMembers. A subsidy is present within the
meaning of Article 1 when a government,23 either directly or indirectly through a
private body, provides a ﬁnancial contribution24 which confers a beneﬁt.25
According to the case law, a beneﬁt is present when the contribution is offered at
better than market terms to the recipient. Such a subsidy has to be ‘speciﬁc’ to an
industry or group of industries within the meaning of Article 2.
Once a speciﬁc subsidy has been found, the substantive disciplines of the SCM
Agreement kick in. If this subsidy is contingent upon exportation or local content,
it is in principle ﬂatly prohibited by virtue of Article 3.26 Against all other speciﬁc
subsidies, an ‘actionable subsidy’ claim could be formulated if it could be
demonstrated that there are adverse effects (Article 5).27 Instead of challenging
such speciﬁc subsidies before the WTO dispute settlement bodies, a WTOMember
is equally allowed to impose CVDs to offset the injury on the domestic market if the
disciplines set out in part V of the SCM Agreement are adhered to. In the next
sections, we explore the extra ﬂexibility given to developing countries regarding
these subsidy and CVD disciplines.
2.2 Special and differential treatment on prohibited subsidies
2.2.1 Export subsidies
Annex VII developing countries: least-developed countries and low-income countries
listed in Annex VII(b). Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement spells out a principle
prohibition on export subsidies. By virtue of Article 27.2(a) juncto Annex VII of the
SCM Agreement, this prohibition does not apply for two groups of developing
countries (Annex VII developing countries): (a) least-developed countries (LDCs)
designated as such by the United Nations (UN);28 and (b) other low-income
countries listed in Annex VII(b) until their gross national income (GNI) per capita
has reached $1,000 per annum (Annex VII(b) countries).29 The Doha Ministerial
Conference decided to raise this threshold to $1,000 in constant 1990 dollars for
three consecutive years.30 But not all developing countries below this threshold
beneﬁt from this S&D treatment since this is conﬁned to those explicitly listed in
Annex VII(b). All original WTOMembers at the time of conclusion of the Uruguay
23Article 1.1(a)(1).
24Or any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of the GATT. Article 1.1(a)(2).
25 Article 1.1(b).
26 These subsidies are deemed to be speciﬁc by virtue of Article 2.3, and, therefore, do not have to pass
the speciﬁcity test.
27 The effect on consumer welfare is not relevant for this analysis. See, for instance, Panel Report,
EC–Large Civil Aircraft (WT/DS316/R, adopted 1 June 2011), para. 1.1991.
28 Annex VII(a) of the SCM Agreement.
29On the use of GNI instead of GNP, see G/SCM/110/Add.8, 16 June 2011.
30Moreover, countries will be re-included when their GNI per capita falls again below $1,000. See
WT/MIN(01)/17, 14 November 2001, paras. 10.1 and 10.4.
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Round with per capita income below the $1,000 were listed.31 On the other hand,
none of the acceding countries was superadded afterwards. For instance, Vietnam,
to its own surprise during the negotiations, could not beneﬁt from this S&D treat-
ment even though its GNI per capitawas below the threshold.32 Another implication
of the closed list seems to be that LDCs (Annex VII(a)) will not continue to beneﬁt
from this exemption in case they graduate from this status on the basis of the UN
deﬁnition and their GNI per capita is still be below the $1,000 threshold. Although
some developing countries have suggested otherwise,33 it would require a highly
‘judicial active’ Panel or Appellate Body to overturn the plain text of Annex VII as it
only stipulates this threshold for those countries listed under paragraph (b).34
Annex VII(b) countries beneﬁt from the export subsidy exemption until their
GNI per capita reaches $1,000 in constant 1990 dollars for three consecutive years,
as reﬂected in the most recent available data.35 Until present, only ﬁve of them have
graduated: Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, Morocco, and Philippines.36
All other listed countries (e.g., India, Indonesia) and current LDCs37 are thus still
exempted from the prohibition on export subsidies. As further explained below,
two caveats are, however, in place: (i) this exemption extinguishes for products that
have reached export competiveness, and (ii) export subsidies are vulnerable to an
actionable subsidy claim or CVD action.
Small trading developing countries. All developing countries that were not covered
under Annex VII were given eight years to phase out their export subsidies (2003),
but could request an extension by the SCM Committee in light of their
development needs under Article 27.4. The SCM Committee had to annually
review the necessity thereof. If a negative determination was made, the export
subsidy had to be phased out within two years from the end of the last authorized
period.38 A major disadvantage of this system was that the year-to-year extensions
generated large uncertainty to governments and their business communities.39 Here
again, the Doha Ministerial Conference provided some more ﬂexibility, without
31With the omission of Honduras, which was added by a technical rectiﬁcation (WT/L/384, 19
December 2000; WT/GC/M/62, 28 February 2001).
32 For a list of other non-original WTO Members with GNI per capita of less than $1,000 in 1990
dollars in 2009, see S. Creskoff and P. Walkenhorst, ‘Implications of WTO Disciplines for Special
Economic Zones in Developing Countries’,World Bank Policy Research Working Paper (2009), 42 pp., at
24.
33 See TN/RL/GEN/177/Rev.2, 18 March 2011, para. 2.
34 The Doha Declaration (para. 10.1) also explicitly referred to Annex VII(b) countries.
35 The methodology for making this calculation is spelled out in G/SCM/38, 26 October 2003.
36 See G/SCM/110/Add 9, 20 June 2012.
37 Also LDCs that are non-original WTOMembers beneﬁt from this exception because Annex VII(a) is
not a closed list.
38 Article 27.4.
39 See R. A. Torres, ‘Free Zones and the World Trade Organization Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures’, 2:5 Global Trade and Customs Journal (2007), 217–223, at 221.
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however extending the eight-year period in general. Only certain small trading
developing countries were granted extensions for those export subsidy programmes
in force in 2001 that provided full or partial exemptions from import duties and
internal taxes.40 The level of subsidies beneﬁting from this transitional period could
not be raised (standstill obligation).41 Until the end of 2013, the SCM Committee
shall continue these authorizations subject only to an annual review of the
transparency and standstill requirements.42 Consequently, their remaining export
subsidies should be phased out no later than 31 December 2015.
Hence, this transitional ﬂexibility to grant export subsidies currently merely
applies to certain small trading developing countries and only with respect to their
listed programmes. These relate to exemptions from import duties and internal
taxes, which are often implemented in export processing zones (EPZs).43 Surely,
this ﬂexibility is relevant because such programmes mostly exempt ﬁrms located in
EPZs from direct taxes and import duties on capital inputs. These measures go
beyond the scope for such exemptions that would be allowed by virtue of footnote
1 of the SCMAgreement juncto the Illustrative List (items (e) and (i)). Yet, the same
two caveats as with regard to Annex VII developing countries apply: extinction in
case of export competitiveness and the possibility for actionable subsidy claims or
CVD responses.
Before going into the ﬁrst caveat, it has to be assessed whether Annex VII(b)
countries could still beneﬁt from the S&D treatment under Article 27.4 in case they
graduate. In a recent proposal, a number of Annex VII(b) countries sought to
‘clarify’ that this ﬂexibility would indeed still be available.44 In their view,
Article 27.2(b) lacks clarity as regards its application to Annex VII countries
because it explicitly refers to ‘the entry into force of the WTO Agreement’ as kick
off point for the eight-year phase-out period, which cannot be applied to graduated
Annex VII countries as they only join this paragraph (b) at a later moment
of time.45 In their reading, the eight-year phase-out period would therefore start
at the moment of graduation and export subsidies would then become subject
to the standstill obligation and ‘development needs’ test.46 Although the text is
40G/SCM/39, 20 November 2001.
41 Article 27.4. See Panel Report, Brazil–Aircraft, paras. 7.58–7.67.
42 See WT/L/691, 31 July 2007.
43 See also Creskoff and Walkenhorst, above n. 32, at 23; Torres, above n. 39, at 221–222.
44 See TN/RL/GEN/177/Rev.2, 18 March 2011.
45 Article 27.2 reads:
The prohibition of paragraph 1(a) of Article 3 shall not apply to:
(a) developing country Members referred to in Annex VII.
(b) other developing country Members for a period of eight years from the date of entry
into force of the WTO Agreement, subject to compliance with the provisions in
paragraph 4. [emphasis added]
46 They also hold that they could beneﬁt from the possibility of further extensions pursuant to
Article 27.4.
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indeed far from clear, it seems more plausible that, as argued by some other WTO
Members,47 this proposal would be an amendment rather than a clariﬁcation.
Indeed, it seems that S&D treatment under Article 27.4 is only applicable to
those Annex VII countries that have explicitly preserved their right to beneﬁt
from the extension offered at Doha. After all, there is no textual basis whatsoever
to start the eight-year phase-out period only at the moment of graduation. In
contrast, ‘the entry into force of the WTO Agreement’ could have been relevant
as the starting point to graduated Annex VII(b) countries in those situations
where they graduated before 2003. Moreover, the phase-out period under
Article 27.4 was only extended for some limited programs of small-trading
countries that had requested such an extension in 2001. Four low-income countries
listed under Annex VII(b) (i.e., Bolivia, Honduras, Kenya, and Sri Lanka)48 have
explicitly preserved their right to similarly beneﬁt from this transitional S&D
treatment in case they would graduate, illustrating that they understood that
such a request was needed.49 Under this reading, only those four countries
will beneﬁt from the limited S&D treatment under Article 27.4 (e.g., standstill) in
case they graduate before 2015. In contrast, all other Annex VII(b) countries,
including those ﬁve countries that have so far graduated under Annex VII(b),
non-original developing countries that acceded after the Doha Ministerial
Conference (2001)50, and graduated LDCs would not beneﬁt from this transitional
ﬂexibility.
Export competitiveness. The ﬂexibility to offer export subsidies for both groups of
developing countries extinguishes for products that have reached export competi-
tiveness. In that case, those export subsidies offered by Annex VII developing
countries have to be phased out within eight years.51 With regard to small trading
developing countries, they even have to be phased within two years.
According to Article 27.6, export competitiveness in a product exists ‘if a
developing country Member’s exports of that product have reached a share of at
least 3.25% in world trade of that product for two consecutive calendar years’. The
focus is therefore on the country’s share in trade, not on its share in total pro-
duction.52 Yet, such export competitiveness is only established, and the extinction
period thus only kicks off, if this is either (a) notiﬁed by the developing country
Member itself or (b) computed by the WTO Secretariat at the request of any
47 TN/RL/W/254, 21 April 2011, para. 34.
48 See G/SCM/N/74/BOL & Suppl.1, G/SCM/N/74/HND, G/SCM/N/74/KEN, and G/SCM/N/74/
LKA.
49 See WT/L/691, 31 July 2007, para. 4.
50 Again, other WTO Members explained this to Vietnam during accession negotiations (WT/ACC/
VNM/29, 30 October 2003).
51 Article 27.5.
52Hence, it excludes production for domestic consumption. See Panel Report, US–Upland Cotton
(WT/DS267/R, adopted 21 March 2005), para. 7.1441.
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other Member.53 The determination therefore de facto depends upon other
Members’ requests to the WTO Secretariat. With regard to Annex VII developing
countries, only two such requests have been formulated so far, both made by the US
(2003, 2010) regarding India’s export competitiveness on textile and apparel
exports.54
These computations revealed two ambiguities in the interpretation of Article
27.6. First, does the concept of ‘world trade’ include trade between countries of the
EU (i.e., intra-EU(27) trade)? Because Article 27.6 contains ‘no guidance’ on this
issue, the WTO Secretariat made calculations on the basis of excluding as well as
including intra-EU(27) trade. Obviously, the required share in world trade is less
easily met in case intra-EU trade is included, and developing countries thus support
calculations made on this basis.55 This view should be endorsed because the
ordinary meaning of ‘world trade’ does not exclude trade between countries
belonging to a customs union. This interpretation equally preserves the recognized
‘important role’ of subsidies for developing countries (Article 27.1), which would
be undermined if a developing country could, without increasing its own share in
world exports, reach export competitiveness on the basis of the formation or
extension of a customs union.
Second, the text of Article 27.6 is also ambiguous on whether products should be
deﬁned at either the section or heading level of the Harmonized System (HS)
Nomenclature. The US therefore requested that the computation was undertaken at
both the section (i.e., ‘Textiles and Textile Articles’) and heading levels.56 The
uncertainty ﬂows from the deﬁnition of a ‘product’ in Article 27.6 as this refers to
‘a section heading’ of the HS Nomenclature, though the HS itself only contains
‘sections’ (group of chapters) or ‘headings’ (four-digit tariff level).57 Because they
will more likely reach export competitiveness in a product deﬁned at heading
level,58 developing countries have pleaded for a deﬁnition at the section level but no
consensus has so far emerged in the SCMCommittee. On the basis of contacts with
participating delegates in the Uruguay Round, Hoda and Ahuja reveal that
negotiators had in mind ‘sections’ and not ‘headings’.59 Moreover, they doubt
whether it is feasible to operate and dismantle an export promotion scheme on a
53Article 27.6 of the SCMAgreement. The Secretariat only makes calculations according to the request
of the WTO Member and does not interpret the results.
54 See G/SCM/132/Add.1, 23 March 2010; G/SCM/103/Add.1, 12 March 2003.
55 See, for example, G/SCM/W/443, 17 May 2001, at 2.
56No request at the section level was made in the 2003 calculations.
57 The HS classiﬁcation consists of 21 ‘sections’, subdivided into 98 ‘chapters’, and further subdivided
into four-digit ‘headings’ and six-digit ‘HS codes’. Tariff lines are deﬁned at the six-digit level (or at further
subdivisions).
58 See also Creskoff and Walkenhorst, above n. 32, footnote 56.
59 A. Hoda and R. Ahuja, ‘Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Need for
Clariﬁcation and Improvement’, 39:6 Journal of World Trade 1009 (2005), 1009–1969, at 1028. See
also G/SCM/W/443, 17 May 2001.
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four-digit heading level.60 On the other hand, the authentic French and Spanish
texts refer to ‘positions’ and ‘partidas’ respectively, which correspond to four-digit
‘headings’ instead of ‘sections’. At ﬁrst sight, the rules of treaty interpretation
(Article 33(3) of the Vienna Convention) might thus rather point to products
deﬁned at the four-digit heading level because this seems the only ‘simultaneous’
ordinary meaning as used in each authentic language.61 But it might be doubted
whether the ordinary meaning of ‘a section heading’ in English could indeed refer
to a ‘heading’ in HS Nomenclature parlance.62 In contrast to the other texts, the
English text rather refers to ‘a section’ under the HS nomenclature. Given this
ambiguity, recourse to preparatory work should be taken (Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention), which leads back to the interpretation of a product at the section level
as this was the drafters’ intention.63
Turning to the 2010 calculations made by the WTO Secretariat, India’s
export competitiveness was found not only on a large number of textile and
apparel products at the heading level, but also at the section level as it reached the
share of 3.25% in world trade for two consecutive calendar years at the end of
2006.64 If the section level is appropriate to deﬁne a ‘product’, India will have
to gradually phase out its export subsidies on all textiles and textile articles over
a period of eight years. This result illustrates the downside, from a developing
country’s perspective, of deﬁning products at the section level as it implies that
all export subsidies on products under the broad section level will have to be
phased out once such export competitiveness has been reached.65 Despite insistence
of the US, India however tactically refuses to start phasing out any export subsidies
as long as the above-mentioned interpretative difﬁculties are not resolved.66,67
Next to this lack of clarity, some developing countries have pointed to two
fundamental ﬂaws in the current deﬁnition of export competitiveness.68 First, the
two-year period is considered too short to neutralize increased market shares
simply resulting from short-term ﬂuctuations in the market.69 This should be
60Hoda and Ahuja, above n. 59, at 1028.
61 Appellate Body Report, US–Softwood Lumber IV (WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 17 February 2004),
para. 59.
62 Indeed, to which element would the preﬁx ‘section’ exactly refer? Sections in the HS Nomenclature
are subdivided in ‘chapters’, which are only then subdivided into ‘headings’.
63 The ‘object and purpose’ to preserve subsidies as a development tool might also rather point to a
product deﬁned at the section level given that export competitiveness is less easily reached and phasing out
is more practicable.
64On the basis of including intra-EU(27) trade.
65 See also G/SCM/M/79, 3 February 2011, para. 148.
66 G/SCM/M/79, 2 February 2012, para. 166.
67 A ﬁnal interpretative difﬁculty is the exact starting point of the eight-year (or two-year in case of
small trading countries) extinction period: the moment when export competitiveness was reached (i.e., the
end of 2006), or when the computation was made (i.e., March 2010).
68 G/SCM/W/431/Rev.1, 20 March 2001; TN/RL/GEN/136, 16 May 2006.
69G/SCM/W/431/Rev.1, 20 March 2001, para. 3.
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replaced by a system of moving average.70 Second, the fact that the phase-out
period has no option for re-inclusion if exports should fall back under the 3.25%
threshold is criticized.71 Here, a ‘stop-the-clock’ mechanism is suggested.72
Whereas some developed countries seem to endorse the thrust of these proposals,73
many other delegates have voiced their disagreement, with the US apparently
taking the most defensive side.74 One might assume that developing countries not
beneﬁting from S&D treatment on export subsidies would likewise not be keen to
support more ﬂexibility, certainly because they might compete at a similar level of
the product ladder.
2.2.2 Local content subsidies
Developing countries are no longer beneﬁting from S&D treatment with regard to
the prohibition on local content subsidies (Article 3.1(b)) since the transitional
period stipulated under Article 27.3 has expired. In principle, ﬂexibility would be
anyway less meaningful because Article III:4 GATT and the TRIMs Agreement
seem to outlaw these subsidies.75 Yet, the TRIMs Agreement still offers limited
S&D treatment on trade-related investment measures, such as local content
requirements.76 In general, developing countries that have notiﬁed their measures
inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement after the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement77 could uphold these if the transitional period is extended by the
Council for Trade in Goods.78 Regarding LDCs, the Hong Kong Ministerial
Declaration even allowed to maintain existing notiﬁed measures that deviate from
the TRIMs Agreement, as well as to introduce new measures, to which the Council
for Trade in Goods would give ‘positive consideration’ when notiﬁed.79 However,
70 Export competitiveness in a certain year would be calculated as an average of the share in exports
over the last ﬁve years and would be present only if such export shares would pass the 3.25 threshold for
two consecutive years. See TN/RL/GEN/136, 16 May 2006.
71 See, for example, G/SCM/W/431/Rev.1, 20 March 2001, para. 4; TN/RL/W/120, 16 June 2003,
para. 10.
72 If export competitiveness would be lost during the phase-out period, the clock would be stopped and
only re-start after it is reached again. If lost after the phase-out period, export subsidies could be re-
introduced until export competitiveness would be established for a second time, in which case a phase-out
period of two years would start to run.
73 See, for instance, G/SCM/W/450, 29 May 2001.
74 See, for example, G/SCM/W/443, 17 May 2001; TN/RL/W/254, 21 April 2011, paras. 9–11.
75 But in contrast to the GATT and the TRIMs Agreement, the SCM Agreement does not provide any
ground for justiﬁcation for local content subsidies and has speciﬁc and stricter dispute settlement provisions
in place.
76 See Article 5 of the TRIMs Agreement (Article 4 is less relevant for our discussion). Regarding
disciplines on local content requirements, see Article 2 juncto Annex, para. 1 of the TRIMs Agreement.
77Or after accession.
78 Article 5.1 juncto 5.3 of the TRIMs. For a list of notiﬁcations, see G/L/900, 21 October 2009,
Annex I.
79 The text does not explicitly state that these notiﬁed new TRIMs have to be approved by the Council
for Trade in Goods but only that they have to be given positive consideration. So far, no notiﬁcations have
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by virtue of Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, developing countries are not
allowed to make the receipt of a subsidy conditional upon a local content
requirement, even if such an investment measure would still beneﬁt from S&D
treatment under the TRIMs Agreement. Indeed, the Panel in Indonesia–Autos
concluded that the obligations under the SCM Agreement and TRIMs Agreement
apply cumulatively.80
2.3 Special and differential treatment on actionable subsidies
S&D treatment on actionable subsidies stipulated in Articles 27.8, 27.9, and
27.13 is in principle available to all ‘developing country’ Members, which is a self-
selected status that could be challenged by other WTO Members.81 However,
China committed upon accession not to rely on this S&D treatment.82 Since it
is likewise excluded from S&D treatment on prohibited subsidies, China’s
multilateral disciplines on subsidies correspond to those of developed countries.
China only explicitly preserved its right to beneﬁt from S&D treatment regarding
CVDs.
What is the scope of developing countries’ S&D treatment on actionable
subsidies?83 By virtue of Article 27.9 of the SCM Agreement, not all three forms of
adverse effects singled out under Article 5 of the SCM Agreement can be invoked
against subsidies offered by developing countries. ‘In the usual case’,84 other
Members can only proceed against injury to their domestic industry as well as
against nulliﬁcation or impairment of tariff concessions or other GATT obligations
undertaken by the subsidizing developing country.85 In essence, this corresponds to
the two ﬁrst types of adverse effects set out under Article 5 of the SCM Agreement
(paragraphs (a) and (b)).
Complaints on the basis of serious prejudice (Article 5(c)), which is the broadest
form of adverse effects, are less evident and might even be impossible today
according to some authors.86 To understand this discussion, Articles 27.8 and 27.9
been introduced. The duration of new TRIMs should not exceed ﬁve years, renewable subject to review and
explicit ‘decision’ by the Council for Trade in Goods. Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(05)/
DEC, 22 December 2005), Annex F.
80 Panel Report, Indonesia–Autos (WT/DS54, 55, 59, 64R, adopted 23 July 1998), paras. 14.47–
14.55.
81Note that there was no disagreement among the parties in Indonesia–Autos that Indonesia was a
developing country entitled to S&D treatment under Article 27.9 of the SCM Agreement. Likewise, all
parties in Brazil–Aircraft agreed that Brazil was a developing country within the meaning of the SCM
Agreement. See Panel Report, Indonesia–Autos, para. 14.157; Panel Report, Brazil–Aircraft, para. 7.38.
82 See Report of the Working Party Report on the Accession of China (WT/ACC/CHN/49), para. 171.
See also G/SCM/M/66, 14 April 2009, paras. 98–99.
83 Article 27.13 regarding privatization programmes has not been relevant in practice.
84 Panel Report, Indonesia–Autos, para. 14.156.
85 Such nulliﬁcation or impairment has to impede or displace imports of a like product of another
Member into the market of the subsidizing developing country Member.
86Hoda and Ahuja, above n. 59, at 1028, 1058, 1059.
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have to be read together. By virtue of Article 27.8, the presumption of serious
prejudice formulated in Article 6.1 could not be invoked against developing
countries, but WTO Members can nevertheless demonstrate, by positive evidence,
that serious prejudice is caused in those four situations stipulated in Article 6.1.87
Further, Article 27.9 clariﬁes that other cases of serious prejudice caused by
subsidizing developing countries can surely not be challenged. As the presumption
in Article 6.1 expired at the end of 1999,88 the S&D treatment on this presumption
articulated in Article 27.8 no longer has legal implications. More important
nowadays is, however, the question whether the four situations opening the door to
a serious prejudice claim have likewise disappeared as a result of the expiration of
Article 6.1. Surprisingly, this issue was left undiscussed by WTO Members at the
time the debate on the extension of Article 6.1 was undertaken. The literature
has been divided on this question. On the one hand, Hoda and Ahuja hold that the
expiration of Article 6.1 implies that action against developing countries on the
basis of the four cases of serious prejudice is excluded. Hence, developing countries
may not be subject to a claim that their subsidies have caused serious prejudice.89
On the other hand, Clarke and Horlick hold that the expiration of the presumption
likely did not alter the four cases upon which serious prejudice can be based.90
They explain that ‘since the presumption of serious prejudice arising in Article 6.1
never applied to developing countries, it could be argued that the deﬁnitional aspect
of Article 6.1 still applies, in order to raise a serious prejudice complaint against a
developing country Member’.91 This interpretation would mean that, in addition
to injury to the domestic industry and nulliﬁcation or impairment, adverse effects
could still be shown on the basis of ‘serious prejudice’ if one of the four situations
stipulated in Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement is present. Once a complainant
has demonstrated the existence of one of these four types of subsidies, it will
subsequently have to advance positive evidence that these subsidies cause serious
prejudice by generating the price/volume effects set out in Article 6.3.92 Although
both interpretations are plausible, I would expect that a Panel confronted with this
87 The four situations are: (a) the total ad valorem subsidization of a product exceeds 5%; (b) the
subsidy covers operating losses sustained by an industry; (c) the subsidy covers operating losses sustained
by an enterprise, other than one time measures; or (d) direct debt forgiveness.
88 See also Appellate Body, EC–Large Civil Aircraft (WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 1 June 2011), para.
668.
89Hoda and Ahuja, above n. 59, at 1029; Torres, above n. 39, footnote 19.
90 See P. A. Clarke and G. N. Horlick, ‘The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’, in
P. F. J. Macrory, A. E. Appleton, and M. G. Plummer (eds.), The World Trade Organization: Legal,
Economic and Political Analysis –Volume I (New York: Springer, 2005), pp. 679–748, at 728–729. Along
the same lines, see F. Piérola, ‘Article 6 SCMA’, in R. Wolfrum, P.-T. Stoll, and M. Koebele (eds.),WTO:
Trade Remedies (Heidelberg: Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law,
2008), pp. 498–536, at 509.
91 See Clarke and Horlick, above n. 90, at 728–729.
92Or a threat of serious prejudice. See Panel Report, Indonesia–Autos, para. 14.169.
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inquiry would foreclose such serious prejudice claim and would rather opt for the
restrictive reading of Article 27.9.93
Is this S&D treatment on actionable subsidies equally available regarding
challenges against export subsidies that are not prohibited by virtue of S&D
treatment? According to most authors, this is not the case.94,95 Such export
subsidies can be challenged on the basis of the actionable subsidy disciplines
similarly as with regard to developed countries. This means that ‘serious prejudice’
can be demonstrated simply on the basis of Article 6.3. Likely, their interpretation
is based on the text of Article 27.7, which refers to the remedies for actionable
subsidies singled out under Article 7:
The provisions of Article 4 shall not apply to a developing country Member in the
case of export subsidies which are in conformity with the provisions of
paragraphs 2 through 5. The relevant provisions in such a case shall be those of
Article 7.96
On the other hand, this provision might be read together with the relevant parts
of Article 27.9, which spells out S&D treatment on actionable subsidies:
Regarding actionable subsidies granted or maintained by a developing country
Member other than those referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 6, action may not
be authorized or taken under Article 7 unless (nulliﬁcation or impairment or
injury to the domestic industry).97
Reading both provisions together, the unsettled query is whether claims against
non-prohibited98 ‘export subsidies’ under Article 7 are limited to those situations
spelled under Article 27.9.99,100 Since even export subsidy could be challenged as
93 First, the text of Article 31 refers to the temporary application of ‘(t) provisions of paragraph 1 of
Article 6 and the provisions of Article 8’ (emphasis added). Hence, it not merely refers to the presumption
elaborated in Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement. Second, the text of Article 27.9 refers to ‘actionable
subsidies . . . referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 6’ and, therefore, seems dependent upon the existence of
this provision. The alternative reading suggested by Horlick and Clarke is possible but would be more
difﬁcult to align to the wording of this text. Third, the restrictive interpretation articulated by Hoda and
Ahuja would mean that the extinction of Article 6.1 not only relaxed disciplines on domestic subsidies for
developed countries (as the presumption of serious prejudice under Article 6.1 collapsed), but likewise for
developing countries. This is justiﬁed given that the status of Article 6.1 was, at least in political terms,
bound to the status of the green light category. In a sense, the collapse of Article 6.1 would thus compensate
both developed and developing countries for more restrictive disciplines on green light subsidies. Fourth
and ﬁnally, a restrictive reading might ﬁnd contextual support in Article 27.1, which underscores the
important role of subsidies in economic development.
94Hoda and Ahuja, above n. 59, at 1028, 1058, 1059. This also seems the position of M. Benitah, The
Law of Subsidies under the GATT/WTO System (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), 424 pp.,
at 258–260, at 39.
95 Remarkably, Brazil seemed to adopt this position before the Panel in Brazil–Aircraft (para. 4.156).
96 Emphasis added.
97 Emphasis added.
98 These are not prohibited by virtue of S&D treatment.
99 Recall that the ‘serious prejudice’ claims might no longer be possible today.
100 The Panel in Indonesia–Autos (paras. 8.53, 8.90, footnote 724) cautiously circumvented this issue.
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an actionable subsidy,101 one might suggest that the term ‘actionable subsidies’ in
Article 27.9 includes ‘export subsidies’. However, the negotiating history rather
seems to conﬁrm that claims against export subsidies beneﬁting from S&D
treatment are likely not constrained by Article 27.9 of the SCM Agreement.102
Therefore, it seems probable that, by virtue of Article 27.7, export subsidies
beneﬁting from S&D treatment are fully actionable under Articles 5 and 6.
2.4 Special and differential treatment on countervailing duties (CVDs)
The S&D treatment provisions described above do not restrict the use of CVDs
against developing countries but merely have an impact on the use of multilateral
remedies. Indeed, Members could impose CVDs to offset speciﬁc subsidies from
developing countries causing injury to their domestic industry. But a novelty of the
SCM Agreement is that a higher threshold is set by raising the de minimis standard
(Article 27.10).103 Such CVD investigations should be terminated if the overall
level of subsidies is less than 2% ad valorem (in contrast to 1% otherwise by virtue
of Article 11.9)104 or if the volume of subsidized imports is less than 4% of the total
imports. Yet, the de minimis volume threshold does not apply if imports from
developing countries whose individual shares are less than 4% collectively account
for more than 9% of total imports.105 Similar to the general de minimis subsidy
benchmark, this S&D treatment is only applicable in the original CVD ‘inves-
tigation’ and not in sunset reviews.106 In principle, all ‘developing countries’ beneﬁt
from this S&D treatment when trading partners aim at imposing CVDs on their
subsidized imports. Because CVDs are imposed unilaterally, the initial decision to
assign the status of ‘developing country’ is however made by the importing country.
For instance, the US does not recognize China and Vietnam as developing countries
in its CVD investigations,107 which could be challenged by both countries.
101Appellate Body Report, US–Large Civil Aircraft (WT/DS353/AB/R, adopted 23 March 2012),
para. 1253; Panel Report, Korea–Commercial Vessels (WT/DS273/R, adopted 1 April 2005), para. 7.334.
102 First, the corresponding provision under the Subsidies Code referred to ‘any subsidy, other than an
export subsidy’ and the replacement by the term ‘actionable subsidies’ in Article 27.9 seems to aim at
implementing the new trafﬁc light approach (in a confusing manner), rather than at substantively
modifying its scope and, therefore, seems not intended to bring ‘export subsidies’ within the scope of
Article 27.9. Second, developing countries signatories already agreed under the Subsidies Code that their
export subsidies should not cause serious prejudice and developed countries aimed at strengthening
disciplines on developing countries during the Uruguay Round. The opposite reading would deprive the
ﬁnal sentence of Article 27.7 (i.e., ‘[t]he relevant provisions in such a case shall be those of Article 7’) of any
substantive meaning.
103 Such S&D treatment was not foreseen under the Subsidies Code (above n. 15).
104Article 27.11 provided for a 3% de minimis threshold for some developing countries, but provision
has expired.
105Article 27.10 of the SCM Agreement.
106 See Appellate Body Report, US–Carbon Steel (WT/DS213/AB/R, adopted 19 December 2002),
para. 82.
107 See A. Gantz, ‘Non-Market Economy Status and US Unfair Trade Actions Against Vietnam’,
Arizona Legal Studies –Discussion Paper (December 2009), 35 pp., at 7.
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Despite this S&D treatment, the majority of CVD action taken since the birth of
the WTO has targeted developing countries’ imports.108,109 More than one third of
all CVD measures imposed to date are installed on imports from India and China.
China only recently became subject to CVD actions given its non-market economy
status, but already replaced India as the main target of CVD action in 2011.
Unsurprisingly, both China and India have introduced proposals aimed at
strengthening the procedural disciplines on CVD investigating authorities.110
India equally proposed to raise the de minimis threshold but there seems not much
support for these proposals.111
The existing substantive and detailed procedural requirements to undertake
CVD action are not relaxed with regard to developing countries. Obviously, this
resource-intensive trade remedy tool is less useful to developing countries and they
might equally be more reluctant to employ this politically sensitive remedy
targeting foreign government action.112 Overall, more than two-thirds of all CVD
actions are undertaken by three developed countries, with the US taking the lion’s
share, followed by the EU and Canada.113 Several other WTOMembers, including
some developing countries, have likewise imposed CVDs but not to a signiﬁcant
extent. China recently started to employ CVDs against the US and EU.114
3. Normative analysis
3.1 Introduction: the rationale for offering and disciplining subsidies
When critically evaluating the regulatory framework sketched out above, the long
understood but still often neglected lesson should be recalled that ‘policy space’ is
not something inherently valuable in the sense of being conductive for spurring
economic growth or, more broadly, sustainable development. Since the rejection of
108 These ﬁgures might be incomplete as they are based on notiﬁcations by Members.
109Developing countries were subject of 61% of all CVDs measures. See WTO Secretariat, World
Trade Report 2009 –Trade Policy Commitments and Contingency Measures (Geneva: WTO Publications,
2009), 171 pp., at 140. See WTO Secretariat statistics based on notiﬁcations by WTOMembers. Available
at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_init_exp_country_e.pdf. http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_meas_exp_country_e.pdf.
110 TN/RL/GEN/160, 4 December 2009; TN/RL/GEN/161, 4 December 2009; TN/RL/GEN/169,
14 October 2010; TN/RL/GEN/164, 8 April 2010.
111 See TN/RM/W/4, 25 April 2002; TN/RL/W/99, 3 May 2003.
112 The latter could explain why large developing countries employ much more frequently anti-
dumping duties. In case of tariff overhang, countries could respond by raising their applied level of tariffs,
but this should be done on an MFN basis.
113Developed countries account for 86% of all CVDs measures (World Trade Report 2009, above
n. 109, at 140). See also WTO Secretariat statistics based on notiﬁcations: http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_init_rep_member_e.pdf. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/cvd_meas_rep_
member_e.pdf.
114 The imposition of CVDs on US broiler products is currently challenged by the US before the WTO
dispute settlement system (DS427).
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mercantilism centuries ago by the founding fathers of the comparative advantage
theory, it is (or should be) common knowledge that curtailing ‘policy space’ on
trade policy might be costly in political terms but beneﬁcial in economic terms.
Regarding policy space on subsidization, it is far from clear why a static welfare-
maximizing government would offer a speciﬁc subsidy to an industry in a world of
perfectly competitive and complete markets. In case this subsidy is provided by a
so-called ‘small’ country (i.e., a country which cannot affect the world price and
thus its terms of trade), a welfare loss arises to this country because the increase in
producer welfare does not cover the cost to the government, although the welfare of
other countries is, by deﬁnition, not affected. A production or export subsidy
offered by a so-called ‘large’ country lowers the world price and, therefore, can
affect the welfare of third countries. Because it negatively affects its terms of trade,
welfare in the subsidizing country deteriorates even more when a subsidy is given
by a ‘large’ country to its export-competing industry.115 Overall, the rest of the
world is better off in welfare terms resulting from the depressed world price, but
net-exporting countries (and all foreign producers) are adversely impacted, whereas
net-importing countries (and all foreign consumers) are beneﬁting.116
To understand why countries offer subsidies to industrial products, political-
economy considerations should be taken on board or the perfectly competitive and
complete markets assumption has to be relaxed. First, political-economy theory
shows that governments could be driven by lobbying efforts of special interest
groups, rather than welfare concerns, when providing subsidies. Second, if the
perfectly competitive and complete markets assumption is relaxed, governments
aiming at maximizing welfare might also offer subsidies in order to correct for
market failures.117 From a normative perspective, both rationales obviously work
in opposite directions. Whereas the political-economy rationale suggests that a
country would be better off in welfare terms if multilateral disciplines prevent
subsidization (‘tie-their-own-hands’ argument), the market failure rationale may
suggest that policy space should be preserved to offer certain subsidies.
Because subsidies could negatively affect the competitive opportunities of foreign
producers, GATT/WTO Members have gradually agreed to reduce the risk of
115A welfare maximizing large country is rather advised to tax exports. A production subsidy to its
import-competing industry could, in theory, be welfare-improving for the subsidizing country, but an
optimal tariff would be a more direct, and thus an efﬁcient, instrument to exploit its terms of trade.
116One reason why these subsidies are usually criticized by third countries could be seen in the fact
that the adversely affected producers are better organised than beneﬁtting consumers.
117 They could also be used to exploit strategic trade opportunities in oligopolistic markets (i.e., proﬁt-
shifting rationale), but this is less relevant in the context of developing countries. J. A. Brander and B.
J. Spencer, ‘Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry’, 18 Journal of International
Economics (1985), 83–100. The speciﬁc assumptions adopted in the Brander−Spencer model also make
export or general output subsidies not a robust policy recommendation. See, e.g., J. Eaton and G.
M. Grossman, ‘Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly’, 101:2 The Quarterly Journal of
Economics (May, 1986).
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subsidy wars and restrict their policy space on subsidization. A mixture of
differences in trade distortive effect and in justiﬁability in terms of correcting for
market failures explains two bifurcations in the development of multilateral
subsidy disciplines. First, the fact that export subsidies are, by their nature, more
likely to distort trade than domestic subsidies, and are less often justiﬁed on the
basis of the market failure rationale, explains why countries have ﬁrst disciplined
export subsidies, and only in a later stage (and to a lesser extent) domestic
subsidies.118 Second, the fact that only subsidies by large countries hurt foreign
producers and that subsidies might be a useful development tool is consistent with
the fact that disciplines were ﬁrst concluded among developed countries and were
only later gradually extended to developing countries.119 In the following sections,
we assess whether the existing disciplines on subsidies leave an appropriate level of
policy space to these developing countries.
3.2 Disciplines on domestic subsidies
3.2.1 The prohibition on local content subsidies
Developing countries enjoyed temporal ﬂexibility on the prohibition on local
content subsidies but this S&D treatment has expired by now. Often, such local
content requirements were put in place as a condition to beneﬁt from subsidization
in EPZs. The strategy was to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) through
subsidization and to ensure, at the same time, that a viable domestic upstream
industry would further develop, for example through knowledge spillovers.
Whereas the question on whether subsidies should be given to attract FDI seems
still open, empirical evidence has shown that restrictive policies such as local
content requirements are in general not conductive for spurring economic
growth.120 Therefore, the prohibition to make subsidies contingent upon local
content seems not problematic. Obviously, developing countries could still spur the
development of the domestic input industry by subsidizing this industry directly
and offer subsidies to attract FDI in the downstream industry. These subsidies
would not be prohibited but would be covered under the general disciplines on
domestic subsidies, to which we turn in the next section.
3.2.2 Disciplines on all other types of domestic subsidies and
countervailing duties
Other WTO Members can take multilateral action against subsidization causing
injury to their domestic industry as well as against nulliﬁcation or impairment of
118 See also Appellate Body Report, US–Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1253.
119Of course, developing countries would be ‘large’with regard to the production of those products in
which they have a substantive share of total production.
120 See, for instance, T. H. Moran, E. M. Graham, and M. Blomström (eds.), Does Foreign Direct
Investment Promote Development? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2005).
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tariff concessions or other GATT obligations (Article 27.9). Although no clear
answer exists, we tentatively concluded that claims based on ‘serious prejudice’
would likely not be allowed anymore. This narrow reading of Article 27.9 should,
for two reasons, be endorsed from a normative perspective.
First, the market failure rationale holds that the success of outward-oriented
development strategies has shown that substantive leeway for subsidization could
be important in the presence of market failures impeding economic growth and
diversiﬁcation (e.g., inducing self-discovery, overcoming coordination failures).121
Admittedly, even under the broad interpretation of Article 27.9, a substantive part
of domestic subsidies aiming at correcting market failures would not be vulnerable
to a challenge on the basis of ‘serious prejudice’ because such challenge would only
be allowed for those types of subsidies listed in Article 6.1 of the SCM
Agreement.122 Regardless of their nature, subsidies exceeding the threshold of
5% total ad valorem in terms of the cost to the government would be vulnerable to
a serious prejudice claim.123 The other types of measures listed in Article 6.1 of the
SCM Agreement mainly target subsidies to enterprises or industries in difﬁculties.
While one might suggest that these other types of subsidies are generally considered
not justiﬁed on economic grounds, temporary subsidization of enterprises having a
dominant position in an undiversiﬁed market might still be warranted.124,125
Second, the systemic rationale, as articulated by Bagwell and Staiger,126 holds
that the supremacy of subsidies over tariffs to correct domestic market failures
carries the risk that overly stringent subsidy disciplines would hamper tariff
negotiations. Such a ‘chilling effect’would be present if developing countries would
be reluctant to cut their tariff levels because their potential subsidies could be
challenged before the WTO. This would be detrimental from the perspective of
both the subsidizing developing country as well as other countries. For instance, a
developing country might be resistant to reduce its bound tariff levels if it is aware
121 The empirical evidence (above n. 6) is theoretically underpinned. The standard rationale for the
infant industry argument rests on the assumption of a capital market failure for which a production subsidy
would at most serve as a second best corrective instrument. Subsidizing ‘infant industries’may be beneﬁcial
in a second-best fashion when, for instance, (i) learning spills over to other actors in the economy;
(ii) information externalities inhibit self-discovery (see below); or (iii) private actors fail to coordinate their
complementary actions.
122Recall that only ‘selective’ domestic subsidies are disciplined (Article 2) and that such serious
prejudice claim would also be dependent on the successful demonstration of trade effects (Article 6.3).
123 See, for example, Panel Report, Indonesia–Autos.
124 Temporary subsidization would slow down the adjustment process in case of congestion in the
labor market. The more workers are unemployed at the same time, the less likely that they will ﬁnd a job.
By temporarily protecting jobs, the chances for unemployed workers to ﬁnd a job increases (congestion is
reduced).
125 Policy space for such subsidies might also be relevant from a systemic perspective (see next
paragraph).
126K. Bagwell and R. W. Staiger, ‘Will International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading
System?’, The American Economic Review (June, 2006), 877–895.
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that subsidies granted to ﬁrms in difﬁculties would be challengeable. The options
given under the restrictive reading of Article 27.9 to formulate a non-violation
complaint or a complaint on the basis of injury to the domestic industry (which is
the multilateral alternative of unilateral CVDs) would exactly safeguard further
tariff negotiations. Indeed, the ﬁrst instrument would ensure that other WTO
Members could effectively beneﬁt from tariff reductions made by the subsidizing
developing country, whereas the presence of the latter option could, in theory,
make it credible to import-competing industries that bound tariff levels will not be
eroded by foreign subsidization.
Importantly, the S&D treatment on domestic (and export) subsidies does not
preclude unilateral CVD action by other WTO Members. Evaluating the potential
for such CVD action, the market failure rationale and systemic rationale point in
different directions. On the one hand, the market failure rationale suggests that
CVD action against corrective subsidization could not be justiﬁed as it might target
‘fair’ subsidization.127 The imposition of CVDs is at odds with the explicit
recognition in the SCM Agreement that subsidies may play an important
development role.128 Hence, the deterrence rationale (i.e., CVDs would deter
wasteful subsidization) justifying CVD action does not hold.129 On the other hand,
CVDs could play a useful role to safeguard tariff negotiations because they provide
importing countries with an instrument ensuring that their bound tariff levels will
not be eroded. Yet, two arguments cast doubt on whether great importance should
be attached to this systemic rationale.130 Firstly, the large majority of CVDs are
imposed by a small group of developed countries upon some industrial products.
Given that these countries already have very low levels of bound tariffs on indu-
strial products, restricting the scope for CVD action would likely not signiﬁcantly
hamper further tariff cuts. Secondly, the multilateral option to challenge domestic
subsidies when causing injury to an import-competing domestic industry would in
principle offer a less trade-distortive alternative, even though the time-consuming
multilateral option might not be considered equally effective by import-competing
industries. On balance, the value of subsidies as a corrective development tool
and the trade-distortive impact of (a threat of) CVD actions, which in practice
127 Because subsidization is welfare improving for net-importing countries, countries have been
advised by Krugman to send a thank you note to the foreign country instead of taking CVD action.
128Article 27.1.
129 The deterrence rationale for CVDs was rejected by proponents of the entitlement theory in the
1980s. C. J. Goetz, L. Granet, and W. F. Schwartz, ‘The Meaning of “Subsidy” and “Injury” in the
Countervailing Duty Law’, 6 International Review of Law and Economics (1986), 17–32; R. Diamond,
‘Economic Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law’, 29 Virginia Journal of International Law (1989),
767–812.
130CVDs would allow governments to make a credible commitment to their import-competing
industries that bound levels will be respected. This would make it more feasible in political-economy terms
to agree upon multilateral tariff reductions. See also A. O. Sykes, ‘Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic
Perspective’, 89 Columbia Law Review (March, 1989), 199–262.
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predominantly target developing countries’ imports, would justify further increas-
ing the de minimis threshold for taking CVD action against developing countries’
imports.131
Given that domestic subsidies offered by developing countries still remain
countervailable and actionable under some circumstances, the reinstallation of a
kind of green light category of domestic subsidies would effectively offer some more
policy space to developing countries. Hoekman et al. have formulated such a
proposal for the reactivation of the green light status of R&D subsidies with respect
to developing countries.132 In particular, ﬂexibility has to be given to tackle
information externalities inhibiting self-discovery as explained by Hausmann and
Rodrik.133,134 To be precise, Hoekman et al.’s reasoning does not assume the mere
reactivation of the R&D subsidies carve-out in its current form stipulated in Article
8 because this only gave leeway to assistance for research aiming at inventing new
products (i.e., on-the-frontier innovations). Instead, assistance promoting self-
discovery aims at supporting ﬁrms to discover which existing products could be
produced domestically at competitive prices (i.e., inside-the-frontier innovations).
They propose increased notiﬁcation and ‘soft’ surveillance to prevent private
capture and to enhance the credibility of exit mechanisms.135 Combining increased
policy space with strengthened international surveillance could indeed be useful,
but only if the carve-out would equally place subsidization outside the reach of
potential CVD action.136
3.3 Disciplines on export subsidies
3.3.1 Policy space given to some developing countries to offer export subsidies
Two broad arguments underpinning the need for policy space to subsidize exports
in developing countries have been distinguished. First, evidence that exporting
ﬁrms are relatively more productive suggests that it might be appropriate to link
131 This has been suggested by India in Doha Round.
132 See TN/RL/41/Rev.1, 10 March 2003.
133 B. M. Hoekman, K. E. Maskus, and K. Saggi, ‘Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries:
Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options’, IBS Research Program on Political and Economic Change,
Working Paper PEC 2004–2003 (May, 2004), 34 pp., at 22–23.
134Rodrik and Hausmann have explained that the cost of discovering what a country can produce
proﬁtable is borne by the initial investor but this has a ‘demonstration effect’ on others to enter this
proﬁtable market without bearing the initial sunk cost. Assuming low barriers to entry, this knowledge
spillover implies that market forces lead to underinvestment in self-discovery. R. Hausmann and D. Rodrik,
‘Economic Development as Self-Discovery’, 72 Journal of Development Economics (2003), 603–633, at
604–605. Empirical support for this market failure hypothesis has been found by B. Klinger and
D. Lederman, ‘Export Discoveries, Diversiﬁcation, and Barriers to Entry’, 35 Economic Systems (2011), at
64–83.
135 See Hoekman, Maskus, and Saggi, above n. 133, at 22–23.
136 Such self-discovery subsidies should extinguish over time, because only in that situation can it be
effectively demonstrated that the products in question can be produced at competitive (i.e., non-subsidized)
prices.
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subsidization aimed at overcoming market failures to export performance (i.e.,
carrot-and-stick rationale), certainly because market failures are often considered
relatively more prevalent in the trading sector. Export subsidies could be used to
overcome market failures related to, for instance, inducing self-discovery.137
Second, the ﬁnding of a learning-by-exportation effect, often combined with the
assumption that such learning spills over to other segments of the economy,
provides an alternative justiﬁcation for subsidizing exports (i.e., productivity
improvement rationale). This exactly explains the plea in a recent World Bank
study by Newfarmer et al. for proactive policies in developing countries to support
trade and export (diversiﬁcation) in particular.138 This study holds that selective
and functional government interventions might be needed to spur export
diversiﬁcation hampered by serious market failures, in which the optimal strategy
depends on the speciﬁc characteristics of each country (‘one size does not ﬁt all’).139
Further, developing countries have underscored that such distortions are more
prevalent in their markets, and export subsidies would thus merely ‘level the
playing ﬁeld’ with exporters from more developed countries.140
At present, only two groups of developing countries still beneﬁt from S&D
treatment on export subsidies.
First, policy space to offer whatever type of export subsidy is offered to LDCs
and those low-income countries listed in Annex VII(b) that have not reached the
$1,000 threshold. Generally speaking, this differentiation on the basis of income
level could be endorsed as the need for S&D treatment on export subsidies might be
grossly related to the level of development. Yet, the exclusion of newly acceded
developing countries (as well as – probably – graduated LDCs) with income levels
below this threshold clearly fails to honour this principle. The assumption that
original WTO developing countries would have ‘paid’ for their S&D treatment by
making deeper concessions fails since newly acceded developing countries have
generally made concessions that are far more extensive. Hence, no justiﬁcation
could be given for their exclusion. A legitimate concern by graduated Annex VII
developing countries is that they will have to eliminate export subsidies from the
moment of graduation. A transparent and well-deﬁned extinction period would
serve the trading interests of their business communities.
137Although failing to discriminate between innovators and imitators, an export subsidy might be
useful to induce self-discovery as it directs innovations at the world market and offers a straightforward
criterion to ﬁlter out unsuccessful innovations ex post (performance criteria). Hausmann and Rodrik,
above n. 134, at 630.
138 See Newfarmer, Shaw, and Walkenhorst, above n. 7.
139 See also Commission on Growth and Development, The Growth Report – Strategies for Sustained
Growth and Inclusive Development (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008), 190 pp., at 11.
140 See, for instance, MTN.GNG/NG10/W/33, 30 November 1989, para. 7; TN/RL/W/99, 6 May
2003. The ﬁrst-best option would be to correct the market failure directly, which does not involve export
subsidization unless, for instance, in case of positive learning-by-exporting externalities.
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Second, some small trading developing counties are allowed to maintain speciﬁc
programmes related to exemptions to exporters from the payment of import duties
and internal taxes, which are often implemented in EPZs. Generally speaking, the
installation of EPZs could be considered as an adequate development strategy so as
to attract FDI and spur exportation in the ﬁrst phase of development, though
empirical evidence on positive productivity effects of FDI (through for instance
knowledge spillovers) is not very strong.141 Anyway, these small trading developing
countries will have to bring their incentive programmes into conformity with the
SCM Agreement as from 2015. This means that rebates offered to exporters will
have to be conﬁned to indirect taxes and tariffs on inputs consumed in the
production process.142
Importantly, this S&D treatment is constrained in a double way. First, such
export subsidies remain actionable and countervailable (Articles 27.7 and
27.10).143 The importance of export subsidies as a development tool in some
circumstances as well as the need for legal certainty not only calls for raising the
threshold to take unilateral CVD action, but likewise suggests that the scope for
actionable subsidies claims taken against export subsidies should be limited (Article
27.4). At present, it appears that WTO Members could base such claims on all
types of adverse effects singled out under Article 5, whereas it would be appropriate
to restrict such potential actions. To temper the risk of subsidy wars and
subsidization not based on the market failure rationale, actionable subsidy claims
could be allowed as originally crafted under Article 27.9. This would mean that
export subsidies could be challenged not only in case injury to other countries’
domestic industry is shown, but equally in those four situations stipulated in Article
6.1 (e.g., subsidization above 5% ad valorem; to cover operating losses) if serious
prejudice could be demonstrated.144
Second, the right to offer export subsidies also extinguishes in case a developing
country has reached export competitiveness in a certain product (Article 27.6). It
seems unlikely that small-trading developing countries and LDCs will soon reach
the required level of export competitiveness (3.25% in world trade) in any product.
Rather, this extinction might be of more signiﬁcance to larger export-oriented
developing countries listed in Annex VII(b), such as India, Indonesia, the
141 Empirical evidence on horizontal spillovers is mixed but the evidence on positive productivity
effects on suppliers (vertical) is somewhat more promising. See, for instance, J. Bitzer and H. Görg, ‘Foreign
Direct Investment, Competition and Industry Performance’, 32:2 The World Economy (2009), 221–233.
Because spillovers are hard to calculate, subsidies might easily be offered beyond legitimate levels. See
B. S. Javorcik, ‘Can Survey Evidence Shed Light on Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment?’, 23:2 The
World Bank Research Observer (Fall 2008), 139–159.
142Alternatively, the export contingency condition attached to incentives implemented in EPZs could
be deleted. These schemes would still be vulnerable to actionable subsidy claims and CVD action. See
Torres, above n. 39, at 220.
143Recall that export subsidies are deemed to be speciﬁc.
144Nulliﬁcation or impairment of tariff concessions is not relevant with regard to export subsidies.
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Philippines, Egypt, and Pakistan.145 Given that a positive determination of India’s
export competitiveness in textiles has recently been made, it will have to gradually
phase out its export subsidies over a period of eight years. Although rather
inscribed on request of other WTO Members to safeguard their trading interests,
this export competitiveness exception seems to serve as a useful exit mechanism in
case export subsidies are no longer strictly needed and when they become
sufﬁciently large to effectively hurt foreign producers.146 Indeed, export subsidies
seem no longer optimal once the infant industry has grown up.147 For example,
discovery-encouraging export subsidies to ﬁrst-movers should only be temporary.
Nonetheless, the above-mentioned World Bank study underscored not only the
importance of the ‘discovery phase’ but equally of the ‘rapid-growth’ or
acceleration phase of exports.148 Because developing countries’ exporters often
fail to penetrate new markets (i.e., geographical diversiﬁcation), graduation on the
basis of export competitiveness should not occur too swiftly. This might underpin
developing countries’ proposals to redeﬁne this concept in a way that export
competitiveness is not achieved as a result of short-term market ﬂuctuations and to
introduce the stop-the-clock mechanism. At the same time, the usefulness of this
exit mechanism should urge WTO Members to solve their disagreements on the
interpretation of essential elements revolving around export competitiveness.
The major downside of this policy space on export subsidies (and domestic
subsidies) is the risk that governments are captured by producers’ interests when
allocating subsidies or when deciding on prolonging subsidization in case the initial
economic justiﬁcation no longer holds. Therefore, some authors like Finger and
Winters regret such ﬂexibility as it prevents those countries to ‘tie their own
hands’.149 Yet, this inherent risk of any government intervention does, at present,
not seem to justify further curtailing this policy ﬂexibility. First, to recall the
conclusion of the above-mentioned World Bank study: ‘laissez-faire policies
combined with low tariffs are rarely sufﬁcient to prompt dynamic export drives
or overcome obstacles in other areas’.150 The prevalence of market failures com-
bined with the importance of dynamic export drives simply calls for some ﬂexibility
on subsidizing exports in low-income developing countries. Second, such an
outward-oriented development strategy would generally be less prone to private
capture than an import-substitution strategy because the former mostly entails a
145 See Creskoff and Walkenhorst, above n. 32, at 23.
146 See, for example, MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29, 22 November 1989, at 2; MTN.GNG/NG10/W/20,
15 June 1988, at 7.
147Other instruments (e.g., domestic subsidies) might become more useful.
148Newfarmer, Shaw, and Walkenhorst, above n. 7.
149M. J. Finger and L. A. Winters, ‘What Can the WTO Do for Developing Countries?’, in A.
O. Krueger (ed.), The WTO as an International Organization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1998), 425 pp., 365–392, at 387.
150 P. Brenton, R. Newfarmer, W. Shaw, and P. Walkenhorts, ‘Breaking Into New Markets:
Overview’, in Newfarmer, Shaw, and Walkenhorst, above n. 7, 1–35, at 27–28.
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cost to the government whereas the latter generates tariff revenue. Third, as a
systematic argument, leaving policy space for a more promising outward-oriented
development strategy might make these countries also more willing to restrict their
policy space to revert to an often detrimental import-substitution development
strategy (e.g., accept further tariff bindings). Fourth, these low-income countries’
budgetary constraints might de facto prevent governments from overly subsidizing
their exporting sector or entering into subsidy wars. Development assistance used
to promote the trading sector might equally offer some oversight when based on
soft or hard conditionality. Fifth, the fact that these countries are often ‘small’ in
terms of production of the subsidized product implies that these subsidies do, in
principle, not substantially hurt foreign producers, and if their share in trade grows
to an extent harmful to foreign producers, the twofold constraint on S&D
treatment becomes relevant (i.e., phase out in case of export competiveness and the
risk of actionable subsidy or CVD action by trading partners). Sixth, and ﬁnally,
making such policy space subject to a development needs test under the WTO so as
to prevent private capture does not seem a suitable option either. Until 2003, other
developing countries were precisely given the right to grant export subsidies insofar
these were consistent with their development needs (Article 27.4). Confronted with
this test, however, the Panel in Brazil–Aircraft correctly deemed this provision as
‘troubling from the perspective of a panel’ because it calls for ‘an inquiry of a
peculiarly economic and political nature’ for which the country in question is best
placed.151
In sum, the limited policy space offered to some low-income developing countries
to subsidize their exports should be preserved. At most, a more efﬁcient notiﬁcation
procedure might increase the transparency on such export subsidies, reduce the risk
of private capture and subsidy wars.152 Yet, explicitly recognising that such
subsidies are granted might not be welcomed by these countries as long as they are
vulnerable for CVD action by trading partners.
3.3.2 The prohibition on export subsidies imposed upon other
developing countries
The prohibition on export subsidies is fully enforceable against all other developing
countries since 2003. Proponents of ‘policy space’ have criticized the limitations set
under the SCM Agreement upon developing countries’ freedom to offer subsidies,
whereby they primarily point to this ban on export subsidies.153 In their view, those
policy constraints would prevent developing countries from adopting the successful
development path followed by the East Asian Miracle countries and high-income
151 See Panel Report, Brazil–Aircraft, para. 7.89 (footnotes deleted).
152 Article 25. The TPRM already partly increases this transparency.
153 See, for instance, D. Rodrik, One Economics –Many Recipes –Globalization, Institutions, and
Economic Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 255 pp., at 148–149; UNCTAD, above
n. 1, at 171.
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countries in their early stages of development. Formulating this argument, Lee has
advanced a proposal to lift this ban and to allow developing countries to offer a
certain amount of (export) subsidies set in accordance to their development
level.154,155 This level of so-called ‘development-facilitation subsidies’ would be
exempted from any potential multilateral (i.e., actionable or prohibited subsidy
claims) or unilateral (i.e., CVDs) response by other Members and would only be
subject to a procedural safeguard so as to prevent abuse.156 Yet, Lee offers no
details on the thorniest facet raised by his proposal: what amount of subsidies
would be allowed for each developing country under such a sliding scale approach?
He only puts forward that this ‘needs to be further debated with respect to their
effect on development’.157 Finally, Lee admits that his proposal might generate a
detrimental subsidy race, but that this issue should be left to the judgment of the
developing country in question.158
Considering the success of the East Asian Miracle countries, one cannot but
concur that such development strategy might no longer be employed by larger
developing countries under the current WTO framework. In its revision of the
factors explaining the East Asian success, the World Bank in its East Asian Miracle
study explicitly acknowledged the contribution of functional government interven-
tions (i.e., targeting exports in general), though it was still somewhat more skeptical
on the importance of selective interventions (i.e., subsidizing certain exporting
sectors or industries in particular).159 Yet, even functional interventions directly
targeting exports in general, like subsidized credits or R&D subsidies available to
all exporters, would likely be captured under the current prohibition on export
subsidies as they are either de jure export contingent or, at least, de facto export
contingent because they are geared to induce future export performance.160
Making general available subsidies conditional upon export performance as part of
a carrot-and-stick strategy is thus no longer allowed. Therefore, even if one doubts
that selective interventions were important to explain the East Asian miracle, it
seems that a similar strategy targeting exports can no longer be put in place by a
154Y.-S. Lee, ‘Facilitating Development in the World Trading System –A Proposal for Development
Facilitation Tariff and Development Facilitating Subsidy’, 38:6 Journal of World Trade (2004), 935–954,
at 948–954.
155 See also Y.-S. Lee, ‘Economic Development and the World Trade Organization: Proposal for the
Agreement on Development Facilitation and the Council for Trade and Development in the WTO’, in
T. Chantal and J. Trachtman (eds.), Developing Countries in the WTO Legal System (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), pp. 291–319.
156Next to notiﬁcation to the WTO, this would provide for prior public notice as well as public
hearings on its implementation.
157 Lee, above n. 154, at 951.
158 Ibid., at 952–953.
159 See World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, above n. 7.
160 Linking R&D subsidies to export performance induces ﬁrms to export rather than to sell
domestically and would thus be contingent upon exportation according to the Appellate Body (see below
n. 165). Export subsidies are also deemed to be speciﬁc (Article 2.3).
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group of developing countries. At the same time, the proposition that the success of
this development strategy would urge a fundamental overhaul of the export subsidy
disciplines has to be nuanced for several reasons.
First, more open trade regimes in exporting markets (e.g., lower tariff barriers
and a decreased scope for competitive subsidization) suggest that the same level of
policy space may not be needed to penetrate export markets. Indeed, it should be
recognized that developed countries’ policy space for subsidization and CVD action
has likewise been constrained since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. This is a
major advantage of the current system for larger developing countries that is often
neglected by those authors pleading for more policy space to developing countries.
Take, for example, the rivalry between Brazil and Canada in the regional aircraft
sector (Embraer versus Bombardier) that was fought out before the WTO. One
might criticize the fact that the SCM Agreement precluded Brazil from offering
export credit support at subsidized terms to Embraer even when, as the Panel
equally acknowledged, this might have been consistent with its development
needs.161 At the same time, Brazil might never have won a subsidy war against
Canada in the regional aircraft sector under the pre-SCM Agreement period. The
strengthening of the disciplines upon Canada under the SCM Agreement might
have reduced the need for Brazil to offer export subsidies so as to compete in this
market.162
Second, the tightening of export subsidy disciplines on developing countries that
are higher on the development ladder might also be beneﬁcial to lower income
developing countries as it facilitates their penetration of new exporting markets.
Again, the fact that a group of low-income developing countries still beneﬁts from
S&D treatment on export subsidies is regularly overlooked by proponents calling
for more ﬂexibility. For example, in making their claim for export subsidies to
induce self-discovery, Hausmann and Rodrik criticize that ‘(n)ew international
agreements in the context of the World Trade Organization have made such
subsidies illegal’.163 Yet, virtually all countries used as examples to underpin their
claim for government interventions inducing self-discovery are still allowed to use
export subsidies to this end.164 Arguably, the value of their S&D treatment would
161 Panel Report, Brazil–Aircraft, para. 7.92. Rodrik pointed to the outcome of this case against Brazil
as an illustration that the WTO precludes successful development strategies. See Rodrik, above n. 153, at
226, footnote 13.
162Developed countries were already subject to a prohibition on export subsidies under the Subsidies
Code. Yet, disciplines on export credit support were far less restrictive and the WTO dispute settlement
system also improved the enforceability of this prohibition. Importantly, Brazil was successful in its various
counterclaims against Canadian export subsidies.
163 R. Hausmann and D. Rodrik, ‘Economic Development as Self-discovery’, 72 Journal of
Development Economics (2003), 603–633. In other publications, Rodrik recognizes that some countries
beneﬁt from an exemption on export subsidies but he often limits this S&D treatment to LDCs (see, for
example, below n. 173).
164Only one of the listed examples has recently graduated (i.e., Dominican Republic).
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be reduced if developing countries with higher income levels would also be allowed
to employ such export subsidies.
Third, domestic rather than trade instruments such as export subsidies become
more relevant for developing countries that have reached a certain income level,
even though the cut-off point is difﬁcult to deﬁne.
For instance, Rodriguez-Clare has argued that countries could in the ﬁrst stage of
development induce self-discovery along the lines suggested by Hausmann and
Rodrik and that, once they have ‘discovered’ their comparative advantage, policies
promoting clustering in some sectors should be put in place.165 Instead of ‘hard’
industrial policies such as import substitution or export promotion used in the
initial phase, ‘soft’ industrial policies such as R&D subsidies, infrastructure
investments, or regulatory reforms inducing clustering in some selected sectors
should be employed in the next phase of development.166 Rodriguez-Clare’s
suggestion to make a prior selection among all sectors which have shown to be
successful in exporting (i.e., in which a country has revealed its comparative
advantage) would likely be insufﬁcient to categorize such grants as ‘export
subsidies’ within the meaning of the SCM Agreement, as long as this subsidy is not
‘geared to induce the promotion of future export performance by the recipient’.167
An export subsidy gives an incentive to export rather than to sell domestically,
which is not present if a subsidy is supposed to boost future exports and domestic
sales to a similar degree (i.e., does not affect the ratio of exports over domestic
sales).168 Thus, not all subsidies to an export-oriented ﬁrm qualify as an export
subsidy.169
Even if one considers inducing self-discovery still important in further stages of
development,170 increased government capabilities might make it no longer needed
165A. Rodríguez-Clare, Microeconomic Interventions after the Washington Consensus (Washington,
DC: Inter-American Development Bank, February 2005), 37 pp., at 23.
166 This would be more transparent and less costly. Rodríguez-Clare, above n. 165, at 28.
167Appellate Body Report, EC–Large Civil Aircraft, paras. 1044, 1086, 1091, 1098, 1099, 1102.
168An export subsidy is only present if it is provided so as to incentivize the recipient to export ‘in a
way that is not simply reﬂective of the conditions of supply and demand in the domestic and export markets
undistorted by the granting of the subsidy’. Appellate Body Report, EC–Large Civil Aircraft, paras. 1045,
1048.
169 Footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement; Appellate Body Report, EC–Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1092.
The Appellate Body has also underscored that export orientation of a ﬁrm may form ‘a relevant factor’ but
is insufﬁcient on itself. See Appellate Body Report, Canada–Aircraft, para. 173 (emphasis in the original).
170 Referring to the ﬁndings by Imbs andWacziarg, Rodriguez-Clare holds that the appropriate mix of
both types of industrial policy depends on the level of development: poor countries should induce self-
discovery and more advanced countries should induce specialization. However, Imbs and Wacziarg show
that countries start specializing relatively late in their development process and specialization of exports
even kicks in at a much later stage. The 2009 World Bank study seems to approach both types of
interventions in a complementary rather than sequential way. H. Hesse, ‘Export Diversiﬁcation and
Economic Growth’, in Newfarmer, Shaw, and Walkenhorst, above n. 7, 55–80, at 58; J. Imbs and
R. Wacziarg, ‘Stages of Diversiﬁcation’, The American Economic Review (March, 2003), 63–86;
Newfarmer, Shaw, and Walkenhorst, above n. 7, at 3–4; Rodríguez-Clare, above n. 165, at 23–24.
106 D OM I N I C C O P P E N S
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745612000493
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:42:28, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
to rely upon export performance so as to assess successful discoveries (i.e., carrot-
and-stick argument).171 In general, domestic market failures inhibiting further
export diversiﬁcation might not necessitate subsidies contingent upon exportation
in case government capabilities and income levels have improved.172 Therefore,
policy space for domestic rather than export subsidies might turn out particularly
relevant in later stages of development. Once more, the reality that all developing
countries are still enjoying more leeway to offer such domestic subsidies under the
SCM Agreement seems not always sufﬁciently understood.173
Fourth, exempting export subsidies offered by all developing countries might
even have an adverse impact on the dynamic of further tariff negotiations. If, as
under Lee’s proposal, WTO Members would be precluded from CVD or
multilateral action against foreign subsidization, they might become reluctant to
make tariff cuts that could be further eroded by such (export) subsidization.174,175
For all these reasons, proposals to reinstall substantive leeway to all developing
countries on export subsidies might be neither strictly needed nor realistic as they
would be opposed by developed as well as low-income developing countries. Yet,
the activation of the prohibition on export subsidies with regard to developing
countries is problematic insofar this ban is drafted in a way that reﬂects the interests
of developed countries. Firstly, the cost to the government standard on export
credit support in the Illustrative List on Export Subsidies is detrimental to export-
ing developing countries, even though the case law has partly reduced this
disequilibrium.176 Secondly, the fact that allowance for duty drawback systems is
only foreseen for inputs ‘consumed in the production of the exported products’
equally puts developing countries’ exporters at a disadvantage because they face
relatively higher tariff levels on capital imports.177 Although India’s proposal in the
Doha Round to allow for rebates on capital goods is considered solid on economic
grounds,178 developed countries lack any incentive to concur because it would ease
171Rodrik, for example, proposes to organize bids for public resources on the basis of pre-investment
proposals so as to subsidize costs of self-discovery. Rodrik, above n. 153, at 117.
172 The interventions listed by Rodrik as part of a successful industrial policy do not necessitate export
subsidies. Rodrik, above n. 153, at 117–119.
173 For instance, Rodrik seems to stress the importance of leeway on domestic subsidization but fails to
take into account the S&D treatment on such subsidies offered under the SCM Agreement. See D. Rodrik,
‘Growth After the Crisis’, Paper prepared for the Commission on Growth and Development (May, 2009),
42 pp., at 23.
174 Such risk would be higher when green light is offered to export subsidies because of their more
direct impact on trade compared to domestic subsidies.
175 Even with the CVD option in place, these countries might prefer substantive tariff overhang to be
able to counter foreign subsidization.
176 See D. Coppens, ‘HowMuch Credit for Export Credit Support Under the SCM Agreement?’, 12:1
Journal of International Economic Law (2009), 63–113.
177Allowing drawbacks on capital inputs is precisely one of the measures that developing countries
still beneﬁting from S&D treatment on export subsidies have implemented as part of their EPZs policy.
However, these exemptions could still be challenged as actionable subsidies or be countervailed.
178Communication from the International Monetary Fund (WT/TF/COH/15, 14 February 2003).
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internal pressure to lower tariffs on capital inputs by developing countries.179
Likewise, India’s demand to allow for a uniform drawback rate for exporters seems
not to be endorsed by most WTO Members either, even though the thrust of this
proposal equally seems valid as it lowers the administrative burden upon
developing countries to implement such resource-intensive drawback systems.180
Conclusion
The SCM Agreement explicitly recognizes the importance of subsidies for spurring
development but equally constrains developing countries’ freedom to rely upon this
policy instrument and does not foreclose that other WTO Members undertake
unilateral CVD action. A group of low-income developing countries is still
exempted from the ban on export subsidies, whereas some small trading countries
also beneﬁt from a limited exemption until 2015. Economic theory and empirical
evidence clearly justify this S&D treatment but likewise suggest that the exposure
of their export subsidies to actionable subsidy claims and CVD action is too
unrestrained. Graduation in case of export competiveness could, on the other hand,
be useful as an exit mechanism when explicit export promotion is no longer strictly
needed and harms other (developing) countries’ trade opportunities. All other
developing countries are currently subject to the prohibition on export subsidies.
Hence, the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, resulting in essence from the
bargain between developed countries over the years, has become fully applicable to
these developing countries and should be amended insofar it works against their
interests. Obviously, the ban on export subsidies ﬁrmly restrains these countries’
policy options. Nonetheless, the concern that the SCM Agreement precludes
developing countries to duplicate the successful development strategy of East Asian
miracle countries has to be nuanced. The prohibition on export subsidies imposed
upon other countries at equal or higher development levels implies that similar
leeway is not necessarily needed to penetrate export markets. Furthermore,
economic research has shown that policy space on domestic rather than export
subsidies becomes pivotal for countries that have reached higher stages on the
development ladder. Here, the SCM Agreement does offer more policy ﬂexibility,
though it has been explained that the exact scope thereof is not fully clear. A
narrow interpretation would be justiﬁed not only on the basis of the importance of
corrective subsidies, but also because it facilitates further tariff concessions. Finally,
procedural and substantive disciplines upon unilateral CVD responses by other
countries have also been elaborated under the SCM Agreement. In legal terms, the
higher de minimis threshold makes it more difﬁcult to impose CVDs against
179 The amendment would place drawbacks on capital inputs outside the reach of actionable subsidy
claims and CVD action.
180Communication from the International Monetary Fund (WT/TF/COH/15, 14 February 2003).
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imports from developing countries. In reality, however, this does not preclude that
the large majority of CVD action is taken by developed countries against imports
from developing countries. Neither the deterrence justiﬁcation, nor the systemic
justiﬁcation could validate this asymmetric practice. Hence, further raising the
de minimis threshold to initiate such CVD action against developing countries’
imports seems defensible.
Returning to Lamy’s opening question, the best contribution that the WTO can
make in this area is certainly not unconstrained ‘policy space’, though speciﬁc
amendments of the existing S&D treatment would increase legal certainty and
economic underpinning. With a paralyzed WTO legislator, some of these sensitive
elements might have to be solved by the WTO adjudicator (or remain unresolved).
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